Good morning. My name is Eric Li, and I was born here. But no, I wasn’t born there. This was where I was born: Shanghai, at the height of the Cultural Revolution. My grandmother tells me that she heard the sound of gunfire along with my first cries. When I was growing up, I was told a story that explained all I ever needed to know that humanity. It went like this. All human societies develop in linear progression, beginning with primitive society, then slave society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and finally, guess where we end up? Communism! Sooner or later, all of humanity, regardless of culture, language, nationality, will arrive at this final stage of political and social development. The entire world’s peoples will be unified in this paradise on earth and live happily ever after. But before we get there, we’re engaged in a struggle between good and evil, the good of socialism against the evil of capitalism, and the good shall triumph. That, of course, was the meta-narrative distilled from the theories of Karl Marx. And the Chinese bought it. We were taught that grand story day in and day out. It became part of us, and we believed in it. The story was a bestseller. About on third of the entire world’s population lived under that meta narrative. Then, the world changed overnight. As for me, disillusioned by the failed religion of my youth, I went to America and became a Berkeley hippie. Now, as I was coming of age, something else happened. As if one big story wasn’t enough, I was told another one. This one was just as grand. It also claims that all human societies develop in a linear progression towards a singular end. This one went as follows. All societies, regardless of culture, be it Christian, Muslim, Confucian, must progress from traditional societies in which groups are the basic units to modern societies in which atomized individuals are the sovereign units, and all these individuals are, by definition, rational, and they all want one thing: the vote. Because they all rational, once given the vote, they produce good government and live happily ever after. Paradise on earth, again. Sooner or later, electoral democracy will be the only political system for all countries and all peoples, with a free market to make them all rich. But before we get there, we’re engaged in a struggle between good and evil. The good belongs to those who are democracies and are charged with a mission of spreading it around the globe, sometimes by force, against the evil of those who do not hold elections. Now. This story also became a bestseller. According to the Freedom House, the number of democracies went from 45 in 1970 to 115 in 2010. In the last 20years, Western elites tirelessly trotted around the globe selling this prospectus: multiple parties fight for political power and everyone voting on them is the only path to salvation to the long-suffering developing world. Those who buy the prospectus are destined for success. Those who do not are doomed to fail. But this time, the Chinese didn’t buy it. Fool me once… The rest is history. In just 3p years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries in the world to its second-largest economy. Six hundred fifty million people were lifted out of poverty. Eighty percent of the entire world’s poverty alleviation during that period happened in China. In other words, all the new and old democracies put together amounted to a mere fraction of what a single, one-party state did without voting. See, I grew up on this stuff: food stamps. Meat was rationed to a few hundred grams per person per month at one point. Needless to say, I ate my grandmother’s portions. So I asked myself, what’s wrong with this picture? Here I am in my hometown, my business growing leaps and bounds. Entrepreneurs are starting companies every day. Middle class is expanding in speed and scale unprecedented in human history. Yet, according to the grand story, none of this should be happening. So I went and did the only thing I could. I studied it. Yes, China is a one-party state run by the Chinese Communist Party, the Party, and they don’t hold elections. There assumptions are made by the dominant political theories of our time. Such a system is operationally rigid, politically closed, and morally illegitimate. Well, the assumptions are wrong. The opposites are true. Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are the three defining characteristics of China’s one-party system. Now, most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is inherently incapable of self-correction. It won’t last long because it cannot adapt. Now here are the facts. In 64 years of running the largest country in the world, the range of the party’s policies has been wider than any other country in recent memory, from radical land collectivization to the Great Leap Forward, then privatization of farmland, then the Cultural Revolution, then Deng Xiaoping’s market reform, then successor Jiang Zemin took the giant political step of opening up party membership to private businesspeople, something unimaginable during Mao’s rule. So the party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions. Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions. For example, term limits. Political leaders used to retain their positions for life, and they used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao was the father of modern China, yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes. So the party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70. One thing we often hear is political reforms have lagged far behind economic reforms and China is in dire need of political reform. But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias. See, some have decided a priori what kinds of changes they want to see, and only such changes can be called political reform. The truth is, political reforms have never stopped. Compared with 30 years ago, 20 years, even 10 years ago, every aspect of Chinese society, how the country is governed, from the most local level to the highest center, are unrecognizable today. Now such changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most fundamental kind. Now I would venture to suggest the Party is the world’s leading expert in political reform. The second assumption is that in a one-party state, power gets concentrated in the hands of the few, and bad governance and corruption follow. Indeed, corruption is a big problem, but let’s first look at the larger context. Now, this maybe be counterintuitive to you. The party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today. China’s highest ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 members. In the most recent one, only five of them came from a background of privilege, so-called Princelings. The other 20, including the President and the Premier, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the percentage of those who were born into power and wealth was even smaller. The vast majority of senior Chinese leaders worked and competed their way to the top. Compare that with the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you’ll find the Party。being near the top in upward mobility. The question then is, how could that be possible in a system run by one party? New we come to a powerful political institution, little-known to Westerners: the Party’s Organization Department. The Department functions like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of the most successful corporations. It operates a rotation pyramid made up of there components: civil service, state-owned enterprises, and social organizations like a university or a community program. The form separate yet integrated career paths for Chinese officials. They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from the bottom, called Keyuan Then they could get promoted through four increasingly elite ranks: fuke, ke, fuchu, and chu. Now these are not moves from karate kids, okay? It’s serious business. The range of positions is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign investment in a city district to manager in a company. Once a year, the department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, their peers, their subordinates. They vet their personal conduct. They conduct public opinion surveys. Then they promote the winners. Throughout their careers, these cadres can move through and out of all three tracks. Over time, the food ones move beyond the four base levels to the fuju and ju, levels. There, they enter high, officialdom. By that point, a typical assignment will be to manage a district with population in the millions or a company with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue. Just to show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900000 fuke and ke levels, 600000 fuchu and chu levels, and only 40000 fuju and ju levels. After the ju levels, the best few move further up several more ranks, and eventually make it to the Central Committee. The process takes two to three decades. Does patronage play a role? Yes of course. But merit remains the fundamental driver. In essence, the Organization Department runs a modernizes version of China’s centuries-old mandarin system. China’s new President Xi Jinping is son of a former leader, which is very unusual, first of his kind to make the top job. Even for him, the career took 30 years. He started as a village manager, and by the time he entered the Politburo, he had managed areas with total population of 150 million people and combined GDPs of 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars. Now, please don’t get me wrong, okay? This is not a putdown of anyone. It’s just a statement of fact. George W. Bush, remember him? This is not a putdown. Before becoming Governor of Texas, or Barack Obama before running for President, could not make even a small county manager in China’s system. Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest. Well, apparently he hadn’t heard of the Organization Department. Now, Westerners always assume that multi-party election with universal suffrage is the only source of political legitimacy. I was asked once, “The Party wasn’t voted in by election. Where is the source of Legitimacy?” I said, “How about competency?”: We all know the facts. In 1949, when the Party took power, China was mired in civil wars, dismembered by foreign aggression, average life expectancy at that time, 42 years old. Today, it’s the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity. Pew Research polls Chinese public attitudes, and here are the numbers in recent years. Satisfaction with the direction of the country: 85 percent. Those who think they’re better off than five years ago, 70%. Those who expects the future to be better, a whopping 82 percent. Financial Times polls global youth attitudes and these numbers, brand new, just came from last week. Ninety-three-percent of China’s GenerationY are optimistic about their country’s future. Now, if this is not legitimacy, I’m not sure what is. In contrast, most electoral democracies around the world are suffering from dismal performance. I don’t need to elaborate for this audience how dysfunctional it is from Washington to European capitals. With a few exceptions, the vast number of developing countries that have adopted electoral regimes are still suffering from poverty and civil strife. Governments get elected, and then they fall below 50 percent approval in a few months and stay there and get worse until the next election. Democracy is becoming a perpetual cycle of elect and regret. At this rate, I’m afraid it is democracy, not China’s one-party system, that is in danger of losing legitimacy. Now, I don’t want to create the misimpression that China’s hunky-dory on the way to some kind of superpowerdom. The country faces enormous challenges. Social and economic problems that come with wrenching change like this are mine-boggling. Pollution is one. Food safety. Population issues. On the political front, the worst problem is corruption. Corruption is widespread and undermines the system and its moral legitimacy. But most analysts mis-diagnose the disease. They say that corruption is the result of the one-party system, and therefore, in order to cure it, you have to do away with the entire system. But a more careful look would tell us otherwise. Transparency International ranks China between 70 and 80 in recent years among 170 countries, and it’s been moving up. India, the largest democracy in the world, 94 and dropping. For the hundred or so countries that are ranked below China, more than half of them are electoral democracies. So if election is the panacea for corruption, how come these countries can’t fix it? Now, I’m a venture capitalist. I make bets. It wouldn’t be fair to end this talk without putting myself on the line and making some predictions. So here they are. In the next 10 years, China will surpass the U.S. and become the largest economy in the world. Income per capital will be near the top of all developing countries. Corruption will be curbed, but not eliminated, and China will move up 10 to 20 notches to above 60 in T.I. ranking. Economic reform will accelerate, political reform will continue, and the one-party system will hold firm. We live in the dusk of an era. Meta-narratives that make universal claims failed us in the 20th century and are failing us in the 21st. Meta-narrative is the cancer that is killing democracy from the inside. Now, I want to clarify something. I’m not here to make an indictment of democracy. On the contrary, I think democracy contributed to the rise of the West and the creation of the modern world. It is the universal claim that many Western elites are making about their political system, the hubris, that is at the heart of the West’s current ills. If they would spend just a little less time on trying to force their way onto others, and a little bit more on political reform at home, they might give their democracy a better chance. China’s political model will never supplant electoral democracy, because unlike the latter, it doesn’t pretend to be universal. It cannot be exported. But that is the point precisely. The significance of China’s example is not that it provides and alternative but the demonstration that alternatives exist. Let us draw to a close this era of meta-narratives. Communism and democracy may both be laudable ideals, but the era of their dogmatic universalism is over. Let us stop telling people and our children there’s only one way to govern ourselves and a ingular future towards which all societies must evolve. It is wrong. It is irresponsible. And worst of all, it is boring. Let universality make way for plurality. Perhaps a more interesting age is upon us. Are we brave enough to welcome it?
我出生在“文化大革命”高潮時(shí)的上海。外婆后來告訴我，她當(dāng)時(shí)抱著襁褓之中啼哭不止的我，心驚膽戰(zhàn)地聽著“武斗”的槍聲。

　　在我少年時(shí)，我被灌輸了一個(gè)關(guān)于人類社會(huì)發(fā)展規(guī)律的大故事，這個(gè)“元敘事”是這樣說的：

　　所有的人類社會(huì)都遵循一個(gè)線性的目標(biāo)明確的發(fā)展規(guī)律，即從原始社會(huì)開始，經(jīng)由奴隸社會(huì)、封建社會(huì)、資本主義社會(huì)、社會(huì)主義社會(huì)，最終過渡到(猜猜這個(gè)終點(diǎn)?)共產(chǎn)主義社會(huì)。共產(chǎn)主義社會(huì)是人類政治、社會(huì)發(fā)展的最高階段，所有的人類社會(huì)，不管民族、文化、語言有何異同，或早或晚都將演進(jìn)到這一階段。人類社會(huì)自此大同，彼此相親相愛，永遠(yuǎn)過著幸福的生活——人間天堂。但在實(shí)現(xiàn)這樣目標(biāo)之前，我們必須投身于正義與邪惡的斗爭，即正義的社會(huì)主義與邪惡的資本主義之間的斗爭，正義終將勝利!

　　當(dāng)然，這就是從馬克思主義發(fā)展而來的社會(huì)發(fā)展階段論，這一“元敘事”在中國影響甚廣。

　　我們從小就被反復(fù)灌輸了這個(gè)宏大故事，幾乎融化到了血液之中，篤信不疑。 這個(gè)“元敘事”不僅征服了中國，也影響了全世界。世界上曾經(jīng)有整整三分之一人在它籠罩之下。

　　然而，忽然一夜之間，蘇聯(lián)崩潰，世界滄桑巨變。 我赴美留學(xué)，改宗成為伯克利的嬉皮士，哈哈!

　　就這樣，開啟了我另一段成年經(jīng)歷，我又被灌輸了一個(gè)全新的宏大敘事，仿佛我這輩子只經(jīng)歷那一個(gè)還不夠似的。這個(gè)宏大敘事的完美程度與早前的那一個(gè)不分伯仲。它同樣宣稱，人類社會(huì)遵循著一個(gè)線性的發(fā)展規(guī)律，指向一個(gè)終極目標(biāo)。敘事故事是這樣展開的：

　　所有的人類社會(huì)，不論其文化有何異同，其民眾是基督徒、穆斯林還是儒家信徒，都將從傳統(tǒng)社會(huì)過渡到現(xiàn)代社會(huì)。在傳統(tǒng)社會(huì)中，最基本的社會(huì)單位是家庭、氏族、部落等群體;而在現(xiàn)代社會(huì)中，最基本的、神圣不可侵犯的社會(huì)單位是原子化的個(gè)人。所有的個(gè)人都被認(rèn)定為是理性的，都有同一個(gè)訴求：選舉權(quán)!

　　因?yàn)槊恳粋�(gè)個(gè)人都是理性的，一旦有了權(quán)選舉，必然會(huì)選出好政府，隨后就可以在好政府的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，過上幸福的生活，相當(dāng)于實(shí)現(xiàn)大同社會(huì)——又是一個(gè)人間天堂。選舉民主制將成為所有國家和民族唯一的政治制度，再加上一個(gè)自由放任的市場讓他們發(fā)財(cái)。當(dāng)然，在實(shí)現(xiàn)這個(gè)目標(biāo)之前，我們必須投身于正義與邪惡的斗爭，即正義的民主與邪惡的不民主之間的斗爭。前者肩負(fù)著在全世界推動(dòng)民主的使命，必要時(shí)甚至可以動(dòng)用武力，來打擊那些不投票不選舉的邪惡勢力。

　　上述宏大敘事同樣傳播甚廣。根據(jù)“自由之家”的統(tǒng)計(jì)，全世界采用選舉民主制的國家，從1970年的45個(gè)已增至2010年的115個(gè)。近20多年來，西方的精英人士孜孜不倦地在全世界奔走，推薦選舉民主這一救世良方。他們聲稱，實(shí)行多黨選舉是拯救發(fā)展中國家于水火的唯一良藥，只要吃下它，就一定會(huì)實(shí)現(xiàn)繁榮，否則，永無翻身之日。

　　但這一次，中國敬謝不敏。

　　歷史是最好的裁判。僅僅30多年間，中國就從世界上最貧困的農(nóng)業(yè)國，一躍而為世界第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體，實(shí)現(xiàn)6.5億人脫貧。實(shí)際上，這期間全世界80%的減貧任務(wù)是由中國完成的。也就是說，如果沒有中國的成績，全世界的減貧成就不值一提。所有老的、新的民主國家的脫貧人口加起來，都不及中國一個(gè)零頭。而取得這些成績的中國，沒有實(shí)行他們所謂的選舉，也沒有實(shí)行多黨制。

　　所以，我禁不住問自己，我眼前畫面到底哪里不對勁兒?我的故鄉(xiāng)上海，一切都已今非昔比，新生企業(yè)如雨后春筍般發(fā)展起來，中產(chǎn)階級(jí)以史無前例的速度和規(guī)模在增長。但根據(jù)西方的那個(gè)宏大敘事，這一切繁榮景象本不應(yīng)該出現(xiàn)。

　　面對這一切，我開始做我唯一可以做的事，即思考它!

　　中國的確是個(gè)一黨制的國家，由中國共產(chǎn)黨長期執(zhí)政，不實(shí)行西方意義上的選舉。按照當(dāng)代主流的政治理論，人們據(jù)此可以生成三個(gè)判斷，即這個(gè)體制一定是僵化的、封閉的、不具合法性的。

　　但這些論斷被證明是完全錯(cuò)誤的。事實(shí)恰恰相反，中國的一黨制具有與時(shí)俱進(jìn)的能力、選賢任能的體制、深植于民心的政權(quán)合法性，這些是確保其成功的核心要素。

　　大多數(shù)政治學(xué)家斷言，一黨制天生缺乏自我糾錯(cuò)能力，因此很難持久。 但歷史實(shí)踐卻證明這一斷言過于自信。中共已經(jīng)在中國這個(gè)世界上最大的國家之一連續(xù)執(zhí)政64年，其政策調(diào)整的幅度超過近代任何國家。從激進(jìn)的土改到“大躍進(jìn)”運(yùn)動(dòng)，再到土地“準(zhǔn)私有化”;從“文化大革命”到鄧小平的市場化改革。鄧小平的繼任者江澤民更進(jìn)一步，主動(dòng)吸納包括民營企業(yè)家在內(nèi)的新社會(huì)階層人士入黨，而這在毛的時(shí)代是不可想象的。事實(shí)證明，中共具有超凡的與時(shí)俱進(jìn)和自我糾錯(cuò)能力。

　　過去實(shí)行的一些不再有效的制度也不斷得到糾正和更新。比如，政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的任期制，毛時(shí)期，政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人實(shí)際上是終身任職的。這容易導(dǎo)致大權(quán)獨(dú)攬、不受制約等問題。毛澤東作為現(xiàn)代中國的締造者，在位晚年也未能避免犯下類似的嚴(yán)重錯(cuò)誤。隨后，中共逐步實(shí)施了領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的任期制，并將任職的年齡上限確定為68到70歲。

　　最近很多人聲稱，相比于經(jīng)濟(jì)改革，中國的政治改革嚴(yán)重滯后，因此當(dāng)前亟需在政改中取得突破。這一論斷實(shí)際上是隱藏著政治偏見的話語陷阱，這個(gè)話語陷阱預(yù)設(shè)了哪些變革才算所謂的政治改革，只有實(shí)行這些特定的變革才行。事實(shí)上，中國的政治改革從未停滯。與三十年、二十年，甚至十年前相比，中國從基層到高層，從社會(huì)各領(lǐng)域到國家治理方式上，都發(fā)生了翻天覆地的變化。如果沒有根本性的政治改革，這一切變化都是不可能的。

　　我甚至想大膽地判斷說，中共是世界第一流的政治改革專家。

　　西方主流的觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，一黨制意味著政治上封閉，一小撮人把持了權(quán)力，必然導(dǎo)致劣政和腐敗。

　　的確，腐敗是一個(gè)大問題。不過，讓我們先打開視野看一下全景。說起來可能令人難以置信，中共內(nèi)部選賢任能競爭之激烈程度，可能超過世界上所有的政治組織。

　　十八大前，中共的最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)機(jī)構(gòu)——中央政治局共有25名委員，其中只有5人出身背景優(yōu)越，也就是所謂的“太子黨”。其余20人，包括國家主席胡錦濤和政府總理溫家寶，都是平民出身。再看300多人組成的十七屆中央委員會(huì)，出身顯赫者的比例更低。可以說，絕大多數(shù)中共高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人都是靠自身努力和激烈競爭獲得晉升的。與其他發(fā)達(dá)國家和發(fā)展中國家統(tǒng)治精英的出身相比，我們必須承認(rèn)中共內(nèi)部平民出身的干部享有廣闊的晉升空間。

　　中共如何在一黨制的基礎(chǔ)上保證選賢任能呢?關(guān)鍵之一是有一個(gè)強(qiáng)有力的組織機(jī)構(gòu)，即組織部。對此西方鮮有人知。這套機(jī)制選賢任能的效力，恐怕最成功的商業(yè)公司都會(huì)自嘆弗如。

　　它像一個(gè)旋轉(zhuǎn)的金字塔，有三個(gè)部位組合而成。

　　中國的公務(wù)人員分為三類：即政府職能部門、國有企業(yè)，以及政府管轄的事業(yè)單位，如大學(xué)、社區(qū)組織等。公務(wù)人員既可以在某一類部門中長期工作，也可以在三類中交替任職。政府以及相關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)一年一度地從大學(xué)畢業(yè)生中招錄人員，大部分新人會(huì)從最低一級(jí)的科員干起。組織部門會(huì)根據(jù)其表現(xiàn)，決定是否將其提升到更高的管理職位上，比如副科、科、副處、處。這可不是電影《龍威小子》中的動(dòng)作名稱，而是嚴(yán)肅的人事工作。

　　這一區(qū)間的職位包羅萬象，既可以負(fù)責(zé)貧困農(nóng)村的衛(wèi)生工作，也可能負(fù)責(zé)城區(qū)里的招商引資，也可能是一家公司的基層經(jīng)理。各級(jí)干部每年都要接受組織部門的考察，其中包括征求上級(jí)、下級(jí)和同事的反饋意見，以及個(gè)人操守審查，此外還有民意調(diào)查，最終擇優(yōu)提職。

　　在整個(gè)職業(yè)生涯中，中共的干部可以在政府職能部門、企業(yè)，以及社會(huì)事業(yè)單位等三大領(lǐng)域內(nèi)輪轉(zhuǎn)任職。在基層表現(xiàn)優(yōu)秀的佼佼者可以晉升為副局和正局級(jí)干部，進(jìn)入高級(jí)干部行列。這一級(jí)別的干部，有可能領(lǐng)導(dǎo)數(shù)百萬人口的城區(qū)，也有可能管理年?duì)I業(yè)收入數(shù)億美元的企業(yè)。從統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)就可以看出選拔局級(jí)干部的競爭有多激烈，2012年，中國科級(jí)與副科級(jí)干部約為90萬人，處級(jí)與副處級(jí)干部約為60萬人，而局級(jí)與副局級(jí)干部僅為4萬人。

　　在局級(jí)干部中，只有最為出眾的極少數(shù)人才有機(jī)會(huì)繼續(xù)晉升，最終進(jìn)入中共中央委員會(huì)。就職業(yè)生涯來看，一位干部要晉升到高層，期間一般要經(jīng)過二三十年的工作歷練。這過程中有任人唯親的問題嗎，當(dāng)然有。但從根本上，干部是否德才兼?zhèn)洳攀翘岚蔚臎Q定性因素。事實(shí)上，中華帝國的官僚體系有著千年歷史，今天中共的組織部門創(chuàng)造性地繼承了這一獨(dú)特的歷史遺產(chǎn)，并發(fā)展成現(xiàn)代化的制度以培養(yǎng)當(dāng)代中國的政治精英。習(xí)近平的履歷就是非常鮮明的例證。習(xí)的父親確實(shí)是中共的一位前領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，但他的仕途也歷經(jīng)了30年之久。習(xí)近平從村干部做起，一步一個(gè)腳印的走到今天這個(gè)崗位。在他進(jìn)入中央政治局之前，他領(lǐng)導(dǎo)過的地區(qū)總?cè)丝诶塾?jì)已超過1.5億，創(chuàng)造的GDP合計(jì)超過1.5萬億美元。

　　千萬不要誤解，這不是針對具體的人，僅僅是事實(shí)的陳述。如果要論政府管理經(jīng)驗(yàn)，小布什在任德州州長前和奧巴馬第一次問鼎美國總統(tǒng)時(shí)，他們資歷還比不上中國一個(gè)小縣長。

　　溫斯頓·丘吉爾曾說：“民主是個(gè)壞制度，但其他制度更壞”�？上�，他沒有見識(shí)過組織部。

　　西方人總認(rèn)為多黨競選和普選是合法性的唯一來源。曾有人問我：“中共不經(jīng)選舉執(zhí)政，其合法性從何而來?”我的回答是：“舍我其誰的執(zhí)政能力。”

　　我們都知道歷史，1949年中共執(zhí)政時(shí)，由于戰(zhàn)火肆虐，外敵橫行，中國的國土四分五裂，滿目瘡痍;中國人的人均壽命僅為41歲。但在今天，中國已躋身世界第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體，成為在全球有重要影響的大國，人民生活迅速改善，人均壽命排名奇跡般地列中等發(fā)達(dá)國家前茅。

　　根據(jù)皮尤研究中心在中國的民意調(diào)查報(bào)告，其中一些數(shù)據(jù)反映了中國的主流民意，其中大部分?jǐn)?shù)據(jù)在近幾十年來十分穩(wěn)定。

　　高達(dá)85%的中國民眾，對國家未來方向表示滿意;70%的民眾認(rèn)為在過去的五年生活得到改善;82%的民眾對未來五年頗感樂觀。

　　英國《金融時(shí)報(bào)》剛剛公布的全球青年人民調(diào)結(jié)果顯示：93%的中國90后年輕人對國家的未來感到樂觀。

　　如果這不是合法性，那我就不知道到底什么才是合法性了。

　　相比之下，全世界大部分選舉民主制國家都處于慘淡經(jīng)營的境況。關(guān)于美國和歐洲的政治困境，在座的聽眾都了然于胸，無需我再詳述。除了極少數(shù)例外，大部分采用選舉的發(fā)展中國家，迄今為止還在遭受貧困和戰(zhàn)火的折磨。政府通過選舉上臺(tái)后，其支持率在幾個(gè)月內(nèi)就會(huì)跌到50%以下，從此一蹶不振甚至持續(xù)走低，直到下一次選舉�？梢哉f，民主已經(jīng)陷入“一次選舉，長期后悔”的周期性怪圈。這樣下去，失去合法性的恐怕不是中國的一黨制，而是選舉民主制。

　　當(dāng)然，我不想造成一種誤會(huì)，認(rèn)為中國成為超級(jí)大國已經(jīng)指日可待了。中國當(dāng)前面臨重大挑戰(zhàn)，巨大變遷帶來的經(jīng)濟(jì)、社會(huì)問題數(shù)不勝數(shù)，譬如環(huán)境污染， 食品安全、人口問題。在政治領(lǐng)域，最大的挑戰(zhàn)是腐敗。

　　目前，腐敗猖獗，危及中國的政治制度及其道德合法性。但是，很多分析人士誤判了腐敗的原因，他們聲稱腐敗是一黨制導(dǎo)致的，只有終結(jié)一黨制才能根絕腐敗。更嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)一點(diǎn)兒的分析將證明這種觀點(diǎn)毫無根據(jù)。

　　據(jù)透明國際發(fā)布的全球清廉指數(shù)排名，中國近年來的排名在第70到80名之間。印度是世界上人口最多的選舉民主制國家，排名第95位，且逐年下滑;希臘排名第80位;印度尼西亞與阿根廷排名并列第100位;菲律賓排名第129位。排名在中國后的約100個(gè)國家中，超過一半是選舉民主制國家。如果選舉是根治腐敗的萬靈藥，為何在這么多國家不靈呢?

　　我是做風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資的，長于預(yù)測。因此，不做幾個(gè)預(yù)測就結(jié)束今天的討論似乎不妥。以下是我的三個(gè)預(yù)測：

　　未來十年：

　　1. 中國將超過美國成為世界第一大經(jīng)濟(jì)體，按人均收入計(jì)算也將在發(fā)展中國家里名列前茅。

　　2. 腐敗雖然無法根絕，但將得到有效控制。在透明國際的全球清廉指數(shù)排行榜上，中國有望繼續(xù)提升10到20名，跨入全球最清廉的前60國之列。

　　3. 經(jīng)濟(jì)改革會(huì)加速實(shí)施，政治改革也將繼續(xù)推進(jìn)，中共仍穩(wěn)固執(zhí)政。 我們正在見證一個(gè)時(shí)代的落幕。共產(chǎn)主義和選舉民主制，都是基于普世價(jià)值的“元敘事”。在20世紀(jì)，我們見證了前者因極端教條而失敗;到21世紀(jì)，后者正重蹈同樣的覆轍。“元敘事”就像癌癥一樣，正在從內(nèi)部吞噬民主。我想澄清一下，我并不是要譴責(zé)民主。相反，我認(rèn)為民主政治對西方的崛起和現(xiàn)代世界的誕生居功至偉。然而，很多西方精英把某一種民主形式模式化、普世化，這是西方當(dāng)前各種病癥的病灶所在。如果西方的精英不是將大把的時(shí)間花在向外國推銷民主上，而是更多關(guān)心一下自身的政治改革，恐怕民主還不至于像今天這樣無望。

　　中國的政治模式不可能取代選舉民主，因?yàn)橹袊鴱牟粚⒆约旱恼�治制度包裝成普世通用的模式，也不熱衷于對外輸出。進(jìn)一步說，中國模式的重要意義，不在于為世界各國提供了一個(gè)可以替代選舉民主的新模式，而在于從實(shí)踐上證明了良政的模式不是單一而是多元的，各國都有可能找到適合本國的政治制度。

　　讓我們?yōu)?ldquo;元敘事”的時(shí)代畫個(gè)句號(hào)吧。共產(chǎn)主義和民主可能都是人類最美好的追求，但它們普世化的教條時(shí)代已經(jīng)過去。我們的下一代，不需要被灌輸說，世界上只有一種政治模式，所有社會(huì)都只有一種歸宿。這是錯(cuò)誤的，不負(fù)責(zé)任的，也是乏味的。多元化正在取代普世化。一個(gè)更精彩的時(shí)代正緩緩拉開帷幕，我們有沒有勇氣擁抱它呢?




「標(biāo)簽: ted演講稿」